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Applying Experimental Economics to Obesity
in the Family Household
Mariah D. Ehmke, Travis Warziniack, Christiane Schroeter, and
Kari Morgan
The objective of this study is to identify experimental economic tools that can be employed
to explain the role of economic behavior in overweight and obesity in the household. We
identify three economic experiments that can be used to understand how parent-child
economic relationships relate to obesity. Loss aversion experiments are discussed as a tool
to understand challenges some individuals face in achieving a healthy diet. Finally, testbed
experiments are introduced as a means to test and understand new policies and incentives
for better health at the household level.
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It is increasingly accepted that both the
environment and behavior affect the propen
sity of overweight and obesity in the household
(French, Story, and Jeffery; Friedman 2003,
2004; Hill 1998, 2003). It is less clear how such
factors interact with the economic characteris
tics of the household. Economists have con
sidered the effects of prices and government
policies on the propensity toward obesity for
certain demographic groups. For example,
overweight and obesity is more prevalent in
low-income households, Hispanic and African
American households, and households with
working mothers (Anderson, Butcher, and
Levine 2003; Sigman-Grant 2003). Although

general macroeconomic analyses of the prob
lem can tell us who is obese, it does not tell us
why they are obese or explain heterogeneity
within the demographic groups.
The need is clear and present to understand
which decisions and behaviors, including
economic behavior, lead to overweight and
obesity in the household. Childhood over
weight and obesity (COO) is of special concern
because we have yet to realize the full
consequences of early overweight and obesity
in life. Over the last 20 years, COO has
increased from 4% to 17% among children
and adolescents between 2 and 19 years of age
in the United States1 (Centers for Disease
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1
Overweight and obesity is categorized by the
Body Mass Index (BMI), which is determined by the
formula: weight/height2 (kg/m2). Among adults, over
weight is classified by a BMI between 25.0 and 29.9,
whereas a BMI greater than or equal to 30.0 defines
obesity (CDC 2004a). Overweight in children is
typically not referred to as ‘‘obesity,’’ although these
terms will be used interchangeably in this paper.
Overweight in children is defined as a BMI that
surpasses the 95th percentile of a fixed distribution for
a child’s age and gender (CDC 2004a).

540

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008

Control and Prevention/National Center for
Health Statistics (CDC 2004a,b, 2006a,b;
Institute of Medicine; Ogden et al.). Current
ly, 61% of overweight children have at least
one additional risk factor for heart disease
and are at greater risk of Type II diabetes.
They also have higher probability of sleep
apnea and social and psychological problems
(CDC 2006b; Mokdad et al.). In the future,
we will see an increased occurrence of lifethreatening illnesses affecting children and
adolescents, such as early kidney failure,
coronary heart disease, and limb amputations
(Ludwig). This is of import to policy devel
opment because society (not just obese
individuals) incurs the costs of obesity
through third-party insurance and govern
ment programs such as Medicare and Medic
aid. As of 2003, obesity contributed to
$75 billion in medical expenditures in the
United States. The state-level annual Medic
aid costs ranged from $23 million in Wyo
ming to $3.5 billion in New York. Annual
Medicare costs ranged from $15 million in
Wyoming to $1.7 billion in California (CDC
2004c). Experts predict the costs of obesity
will jeopardize the solvency of Medicare in the
future (Ludwig).
The objective of this study is to outline
experimental economic tools that could help
explain the effect of economic behavior on
overweight and obesity in the household. Over
the last 25 years, economists have used
experiments to develop policies relating to
problems such as pollution and environmental
regulation (e.g., Cason; Cason, Gangadharan,
and Duke 2003; Cherry, Crocker, and Shog
ren), airline deregulation (Smith), and ac
counting issues (e.g., Kachelmeier and Sheha
ta). These experiments shed light on important
behavioral considerations beyond institutional
constructs, which improve market allocation
efficiencies and policy outcomes. In this spirit,
we discuss the behavioral dimensions that
other fields find relevant to the obesity
epidemic. We then identify possible economic
behaviors, their relevant experiments, and
which tools can be used for understanding
these behaviors.

Background
Although family genetics do influence an
individual’s susceptibility toward overweight
and obesity, the rapid change in its prevalence
is evidence of changing behavioral and envi
ronmental factors affecting individual weight
outcomes (French, Story, and Jeffrey; Friedman 2003, 2004; Hill 1998, 2003). These
behavioral and environmental factors are
broad and far-reaching. Thus far, many
researchers outside of economics have focused
more on micro- rather than macro-level issues
and variables. Specifically, different dimen
sions of parent-child and family relationships
are identified as key elements to understand
ing child health outcomes (Agras and Masco
la; Birch and Fisher; Fiore et al.; Gable and
Lutz; Patrick and Nicklas; Stang, Rehorst,
and Golicic; Strauss and Knight).
Recent literature focuses on parent feeding
styles with their child. Family attitudes and
beliefs relating to food determine when, where,
and how children eat, even beyond the
preschool years (Birch and Fisher; Faith et
al.; Stang). Whether or not families eat
together influences the child’s food knowledge
and habits, especially with regard to fruit and
vegetable consumption (Cooke et al.; Davison,
Francis, and Birch; Mamum et al.; Schroeter,
House, and Lorence; Variyam, Shim, and
Blaylock; Wardle, Carnell, and Cooke). When
feeding children, it is important that parents
are not excessive in restricting access to
unhealthy foods, do not overly encourage the
eating of certain foods, and limit the use of
food as a reward (Ritchie et al.). This style of
feeding has been defined as ‘‘authoritative’’—
parents encourage healthy eating, but the
children are given the ultimate choice in
deciding what they eat (Davison, Francis,
and Birch; Patrick et al.). Two other feeding
styles are ‘‘authoritarian’’ and ‘‘permissive.’’
Authoritarian parents exercise extreme control
over eating. This can be negative if parents
limit children’s abilities to self-regulate their
food intake (Ritchie et al.). On the other hand,
permissive parents often allow the child too
much freedom over food eating without
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structured meal settings, which also leads to
increased risk of overweight and obesity.
In addition to parent feeding behavior,
parent-child physical fitness relationships are
also important. Children’s physical fitness is
shaped by their parents’ physical fitness behav
ior and attitudes (e.g., Epstein et al.; Lindsay
et al.). Parents model active behavior when they
engage in sports and actively play with their
child. Other behaviors that contribute to seden
tary behavior, such as television viewing, could
be influenced by family, too (Lindsay et al.).
So far, the role of economics becomes more
obvious at the macro level when considering
environmental variables influencing obesity
and overweight. Economists find changing
values of time, food costs, food technology,
and physical activity all coincide with increas
ing overweight and obesity in the household.
Over the past two decades, higher wages in the
workplace led to a decrease in the household
time devoted to family meal preparation
(Capps, Tedford, and Havlicek; Chou and
Grossman). Convenience and fast food de
mand has increased because of a higher
number of women working. A factor contrib
uting to the increased demand for food away
from home is the doubling of the per capita
number of fast food restaurants between 1972
and 1997, reducing the search and travel time
for food (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer).
As time increased in value, food costs fell
because of production technology improve
ments and agricultural policy incentives.
Agricultural policies and the switch from
individual to mass food preparation have
reduced the price of food energy consumed
(Drenowski; Pollan). At the same time,
technological change lowered real food prices
while shifting the work environment from
manual to sedentary labor (Lakdawalla and
Philipson; Philipson and Posner). Of each
consumer dollar spent, food accounted for
13 cents in 2003, down from 32 cents in
1950 and 43 cents in 1901 (Atkinson). 2
2
Recent estimates by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture/Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS)
suggest that the share of disposable income spent on
food is about 9.9% (2006).
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Unfortunately, these price reductions have
nonmarket costs linked to them. The resulting
lower cost energy sources have been noted for
their high fat and sugar content (Drenowski).
High-calorie foods have assumed a main role
in the U.S. food supply because they are goodtasting, cheap, and convenient to consume
(Drenowski and Levine). Although the num
ber of calories consumed has increased,
calories expended have remained relatively
constant since the 1980s (Cutler, Glaeser, and
Shapiro). The resulting energy imbalance
manifested itself in higher weight.
Other, noneconomic environmental vari
ables affecting overweight and obesity include
changes at home and in schools. These
variables include the physical structure of the
neighborhood and school food policies, in
particular the availability of soda and vending
machine snacks (Anderson and Butcher;
Economist).
Economic Experiments and Obesity
The existing economic literature does not
determine who is most susceptible to changes
(such as a ‘‘fat tax’’) in the economic
environment or how they translate to specific
household behavior.3 We believe a better
understanding of the economic behaviors
underlying the obesity epidemic is necessary
to formulate effective policy interventions. We
identify several economic behaviors related to
obesity, and their relevant experiments are
presented in Table 1. Four economic experi
ments (dictator, ultimatum bargaining, trust,
and ‘‘carrot stick’’ experiments) could be
employed to understand how parent and child
economic relationships relate to obesity. Food
policy research suggests time preference is
important in the timing and consistency of
food purchases in the household (Shapiro;
Sigman-Grant). A basic time preference ex
periment is identified as a tool to measure
individuals’ discount rates and how they relate
to overweight and obesity in the household.
3
Several states plan to impose or broaden sales
taxes or ‘‘fat taxes’’ on soft drinks or syrups and to
adjust taxes on other food items (Uhlman).
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Table 1. Dimensions of Economic Behavior and Related Economic Experiments
Obesity-Linked Issue
Parent control relating to food
Irregular food consumption
over monthly period
Unhealthy eating habits continue
Poor incentives to be healthy

Economic Behavior of
Interest/Issue
Power and control in the
household
Hyperbolic discounting
Loss aversion
Incentive design

Loss aversion experiments are discussed as a
tool to understand the challenges some
individuals face in achieving a healthy diet.
Finally, testbed experiments are introduced as
a means to test and understand new policies
and incentives for better health at the house
hold level.
Bargaining/Negotiation Experiments
Children differ from adults in that they are not
primarily price-takers in the market. Children
typically receive the food they eat from their
parents. As the literature suggests, the way in
which this transfer occurs can vary dramati
cally from family to family (Birch and Fisher;
Fiore et al.; Gable and Lutz; Patrick and
Nicklas; Stang, Rehorst, and Golicic; Strauss
and Knight). Economists can use economic
experiments to determine how differences in
parenting styles might also be reflected in
differences in economic behavior between the
parent and child. The dictator game, ultima
tum bargaining game, and carrot stick exper
iments measure generosity, fairness, and pun
ishment and reward expectations between
individuals. In this two-player dictator game,
a dictator is endowed with an allocation, x,
and decides what portion of x to give the other
player, the recipient. The Nash equilibrium
prediction is that the dictator will give the
recipient nothing through self-interest. Yet,
the standard experimental result rejects the
notion of complete self-interest. Instead, the
dictator gives the recipient at least some small
portion of the allocation (Davis and Holt).
This indicates that there is some level of
altruism compelling individuals to share their
riches.

Economic Experiment
Bargaining and negotiation
experiments
Time preference/hyperbolic
discounting
Loss aversion
Testbed experiments

The ultimatum bargaining game is like the
dictator game, but the recipient has an
opportunity to respond to the dictator’s offer.
The dictator becomes a proposer, and the
recipient can either accept or reject the offer
made. The Nash equilibrium prediction is that
the proposer will make a very small offer, e,
and the respondent will accept this offer
because it is better than nothing. Again, the
Nash equilibrium is rejected in experiments.
The proposer offers a substantial portion of
the endowment, from 25% to 50%, and the
respondent demands a similar amount. The
amount offered and accepted depends on the
proposer and respondent’s social and cultural
fairness norms (Henrich et al.; Roth et al.).
Although both of these experiments may
be used to measure basic economic behavior in
the household, they do not allow continuous
interaction between household members. One
experiment that does allow for continuous
interaction is the carrot stick experiment
developed by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Ves
terlund. Unlike the dictator game, the respon
dent is given the opportunity to punish or
reward the dictator after receiving an alloca
tion from the endowment. The respondent can
pay the experimenter a small fee (e.g., 1 dollar
or token) to give (reward) or take (punish) a
notable amount (e.g., 4 dollars or tokens)
from the dictator. If the respondent takes
earnings away from the dictator, the earnings
go to the experiment bank, not directly to the
respondent. Likewise, if the respondent gives
earnings to the dictator, they are bought from
the experiment bank and do not come directly
from the respondent. This arrangement makes
either giving or taking earnings from the
dictator more direct reward or punishment.
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The respondent also has the option not to
change the dictator’s earnings in any way.
Ehmke et al. adapted the carrot stick game
to measure control dynamics in the parentchild relationship that could affect COO. The
parent is placed in the dictator role and the
child is the respondent. The parent is endowed
with $5.00 in $0.25 tokens. He or she decides
how many tokens to send to the child. Once the
child receives his or her tokens, the child then
decides whether or not to reward or punish the
parent. When the game is complete, the child
has the option to spend his or her tokens in the
experimental store. Following within subject
design, the experimental store is stocked with
toys and books in the first treatment and with
junk food in the second treatment. The
experiment is used to test several hypotheses,
including whether parental giving is signifi
cantly different across treatments on the basis
of both child and parental weight status.
The results from the experiment indicate
that parental weight is the most important
determinant of parental generosity and child
control in the game. All parents give an
average of 56% of the endowment to their
children in the nonfood treatment. This drops
to an average of 33% of the endowment given
to children in the food treatment. However,
giving between healthy (parent BMI # 25) and
overweight and obese parents (parents BMI .
25) is significantly different. Parents with
higher BMIs give more to their children to
spend on junk food. This indicates heavier
parents might be less concerned with the
consequences of giving their children money
to spend on junk food.
Such experiments provide an important
link to understanding the connection between
economic behavior and other general family
health– and nutrition-related behavior. They
also provide a potential tie between economics
and research in other disciplines, including
psychology, sociology, family studies, and
health fields.
Time Preference Experiments
One of the challenges for many households is
to maintain a healthy and steady nutritional
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intake over the course of the month. Young
children are not able to make the metabolic
adjustments to variations in calorie intake and
are more at risk of overweight and obesity
(Sigman-Grant). Thus, food insecurity could
be a factor in obesity prevalence. Shapiro finds
caloric intake among low-income food stamp
recipients declines 10% to 15% over the course
of a month. The relationship between food
stamp use and overweight and obesity is
positive for low-income women and young
girls, but leads to underweight boys (Gibson).
When food stamps are dispersed at the
beginning of the month, approximately 90%
are spent in the first 3 days of dispersion
(Klinefelter). This evidence implies food stamp
recipients display a high, if not hyperbolic
time preference.
Harrison, Lau, and Williams designed one
of the most referenced experiments for mea
suring time preference. They develop a basic
methodology to measure subjects’ discount
rates. In their study, Danish subjects were
asked if they would prefer to have $100 in 1
month or $100 + x in 7 months. Subjects
answered 15 repeated versions of this ques
tion, with x increasing in each question. The
researchers aim was to determine the point at
which a subject chooses to receive payment in
7 months instead of in the next month. If a
subject chooses to receive the money in 7
months, it is implied that their discount rate is
x% over the 6-month period.
This experiment can be adjusted to account
for hyperbolic discounting. Individuals exhibit
hyperbolic discounting when their discount
rate (i.e., internal interest rate) is not consis
tent over time and actually declining over time
(Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue).
More simply, individuals value short-term
gains/losses more than long-term gains/losses.
The Harrison, Lau, and Williams experiment
can be adjusted to measure the degree of
hyperbolic discounting a subject exhibits.
Using the Harrison, Lau, and Williams
experiment, the subject first decides whether
she wants $100 in 1 week or $100 + x in 8 days.
Then, she is asked whether she would like
$100 in 7 months or $100 + x in 7 months and
1 day. If she displays hyperbolic discounting,

544

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008

she will be less willing to wait for x in 8 days,
but more indifferent to waiting for it in 7
months versus 7 months and 1 day.
Experimental measures of individual dis
count rates could help explain the challenges
that low-income families face as they allocate
food expenditures over a month. It could be
that the hyperbolic discounting behavior
observed by Shapiro might be measurable in
an experimental setting. If there is a relation
ship between high and/or hyperbolic time
preference and an individual’s diet composi
tion, economic experiments can explain these
relationships. Policy mechanisms might then
be better designed to help low-income house
holds with high or irregular time preference to
eat a more healthy diet throughout the month.
Loss Aversion Experiments
A healthy diet is one key to a healthy weight.
For many, though, ‘‘dieting’’ is often viewed
as sacrificing food consumption to gain health
benefits, and despite prior plans to make this
sacrifice, many fail to actually carry it out.
One reason individuals struggle to maintain a
healthy diet might be because of an economic
phenomenon called loss aversion. Loss aver
sion is the tendency for people to base
decisions on movements away from a current
state rather than on the final outcome and to
regard losses from that state more than gains
(see Kahneman and Tversky, and Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler for evidence and model
specifications).
If people are loss-averse, atmosphere be
comes an important part of their diet struggle.
Studies have shown that anticipation of food,
whether physical (sight, smell) or psycholog
ical (thought of food), can trigger biological
responses that prepare the body to digest food
(Johnson and Wildman; Mattes; Powley;
Simon et al.). If passing fast food restaurants
and vending machines can trigger a physio
logical response, individuals must constantly
choose not to consume these products, rather
than decide whether and what to eat, as
implied by traditional utility theory. Compar
ison of food intake surveys by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) shows

that caloric intake during meals has declined,
whereas the number of calories during snacks
has increased (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro).4
Even if a person originally preferred a healthy
lifestyle to an unhealthy lifestyle, loss aversion
allows an immediate reversal of preferences
once snacks or fast food meals become
available.
Experiments have been designed to mea
sure loss aversion with riskless and risky
choices. One common experiment to test for
loss aversion in riskless choices begins by
randomly selecting half the participants in an
experiment to endow with an object of value.
For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Tha
ler endow half their subjects with coffee mugs
and ballpoint pens. After allowing all partic
ipants to thoroughly inspect the object,
willingness to pay is calculated for the group
without the object and willingness to accept is
calculated for individuals endowed with the
object. If the objects are assigned randomly,
there is no reason one group would have
stronger preferences than the other. However,
experiments show that those endowed with the
object value the object much more than those
not endowed with the object. The ratio of
willingness to accept to willingness to pay
measures the degree of loss aversion.
Another version of these experiments is to
give half of the participants in an experiment
one item and half of the participants another
item of equal value. After inspection of the
items, participants are given the opportunity
to switch. If the allocation is random, one
would expect either a strong preference for
one of the goods (perhaps everyone likes the
first good more) or about half the participants
to switch. Instead, experiments find a strong
bias against switching. Knetsch and Sinden
carried out this experiment with a lottery
ticket and $2. This experiment can test for the
presence of loss aversion but it cannot
measure it.
Perhaps the simplest way to measure an
individual’s loss aversion occurs under uncer
4

There is a strong link between caloric intake and
portion size (Rolls et al. 2002; Nielsen and Papkin
2003; Diliberti et al. 2004)
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tainty. Gätcher and Johnson ask subjects
whether they would be willing to accept a
gamble of winning $X or losing $Y based on a
coin toss. Keeping X constant, they increase Y
incrementally until the participant no longer
accepts the gamble. For small monetary
amounts, they argue that the ratio X/Y
measures the degree of loss aversion.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser found evidence
of loss aversion in both survey and field data.5
In their lab experiments, they provided several
scenarios about investment portfolios. In one
treatment, they asked subjects in which of four
portfolios they would invest a large inherited
sum of money. In another treatment, they ask
subjects which of the same four investments
they would choose, but instead of inheriting
money, they inherit one of the portfolios.
There is a strong tendency for people not to
switch regardless of the portfolio inherited.
They find similar evidence in actual decisions
between health care and retirement plans.
The presence of loss aversion has direct
implications for dietary policy and goals.
When framing the dietary discussion, loss
averse individuals will be more swayed by
what they will have to give up rather than by
what they gain. Levin et al. showed this to be
true with regard to controlling cholesterol.
Participants told the positive benefits of
reducing red meat consumption were less
likely to reduce their consumption than those
given the same information focusing on the
negative effects of continuing to eat red meat.
In light of these findings, two things
become evident. First, if the goal is to move
an individual away from an unhealthy life
style, the most effective way might be to focus
on the negative effects of the current lifestyle
rather than the positive effects of a new
lifestyle. Second, in the long run, the best
policy might be to develop a ‘‘culture of
health,’’ wherein choosing the unhealthy
lifestyle means giving something up, rather
than the other way around, as most people
may currently view it.

5
Samuelson and Zeckhauser call the effect ‘‘status
quo bias.’’
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Testbed Experiments
A type of economic experiment named
‘‘testbed’’ experiments might be helpful when
considering new approaches to align the costs
of obesity with the decisions that result in
obesity. Testbed experiments are used to
implement new processes and ensure that
these processes work once they are imple
mented. Plott (1994) discusses the use of
testbedding as it applies to market experi
ments. Through testbed experiments, market
policies are testbedded either to ensure design
consistency or to see whether the theory
underlying a mechanism correctly explains
what the mechanism accomplishes. With
market inefficiencies, the experiments can be
used to test theoretical explanations of the
efficiencies and how the markets could be
improved.
Testbed experiments could be useful tools
as policy makers and business managers
consider new ways to deal with the surmount
ing but disproportionally dispersed health care
costs. If government or private industry want
to consider schemes to more closely align costs
with the individual (e.g., Medical Savings
Accounts are currently being implemented to
do this), they can test new approaches with the
use of testbed experiments. This can be done
as overall policies are developed or as
incremental processes needed to achieve these
policy are developed (e.g., Plott [1997] uses
testbed experiments to understand different
steps in the Federal Communications Com
mission’s auction of licenses for personal
communication systems). Furthermore, they
could be used to explore what other social
factors influence individuals’ support of new
insurance and policy schemes (Durant and
Putterman). For example, one question to
explore might be whether individuals’ prefer
ences for progressive taxation override the
acceptability of a flat tax in the form of a fat
tax in order to reduce unhealthy food
consumption.
In the case of health insurance and public
health programs, testbed experiments could be
used to test mechanism design alternatives to
increase individual incentives for individual
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health and weight reduction. Some programs
that have been considered include reducing
health care premiums for those who maintain
a healthy lifestyle. A testbed experiment could
be used to determine what premium reduction
would increase participation in such programs
and how long a participant would need to
participate for insurance companies to benefit.
A laboratory experiment could be designed
across multiple rounds, with individuals play
ing the roles of the insured and insurer.
Testbed experiments offer cost advantages
to companies and government officials as they
develop new experiments. In the case of health
care, the costs of implementing new policies
are high and the possible costs associated with
poor outcomes could be even higher. By
testing new policies and incentives in the lab,
practitioners could save society substantial
loss associated with the costs of implementa
tion.
Conclusions and Recommendations for
Future Research
The obesity epidemic has been compared with
global warming. Although not all of the
scientific evidence is at its full potential,
especially with regard to childhood obesity,
enough is present to encourage action before
the full evidence of potential disaster sets in
(Ludwig). As we consider the possible actions
to prevent and deal with this looming health
threat, economic experiments are a convenient
way to test underlying causes of and possible
policy solutions for the problem. They could
be specifically helpful at the household level to
understand underlying economic behavior
issues, as well as how households interact with
the market for policy design.
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